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1. Introduction
As the electro-mechanical industrial revolution unfolded in the early twentieth
century, bringing with it the wonders of mass electrification, automobiles,
telecommunications and air travel, Australia's business and political elite made
sure that Australians could participate not only as consumers, but also as producers.
Education and investment combined to guarantee that Australians could
understand, develop and employ these technologies. In tum, mastery of these fields
underpinned Australia's prosperity, and ensured that the nation continued to
develop as a technologically sophisticated society, able to defend itself and provide
challenging and satisfying work for its citizens.
In recent decades, however, as two successive technological and industrial
revolutions have transformed the global economy, Australia has failed to build
significant positions in either. In software and electronics, Australia has been
left behind; in biotechnology it threatens to be. In all three, Australia now
participates almost exclusively as a consumer and not as a producer. This
weakness shows no signs of turning around, in spite of more than a decade
of unprecedented prosperity. Nor has the contemporary Australian economy
proven particularly successful at generating new approaches within its
traditional industries. Why? This failure to innovate is all the more puzzling
since it stands in sharp conrrast to the nation's success in established industries
over rhe same period. Why the difference? Why should Australia be
apparently so good at 'routine' economic activity and yet so poor ar
innovation?
This chapter will argue that much of the explanation stems from Australia's
failure ro develop financial and organisational vehicles capable of managing
the special forms of risk inherent in contemporary technological innovation.
Australia's effort to build a 'market-oriented' innovation system, the very
source of its success in rourine economics, may be precisely the factor retarding
the nation's innovation performance.
No successful innovating country today relies on free markets alone to finance
innovation. There are good reasons for this. While markets are undoubtedly
powerful and effective resource allocators, better than any known alternative for
most transactions, they fail in the face of certain types of economic challenge
because they can't manage the form of information involved - in the case of
innovation, they can't manage information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse
selection (these terms will be explained below). As a result of these weaknesses,
markets alone neither enable innovators to capture sufficient returns, nor to insure
adequately against the consequences of failure.
An effective national innovation system must therefore comprise both market and
non-market resource-allocation systems, for different economic and technical tasks.
And all effective systems do. But Australia has recently tended not to. An unsought
consequence of over-reliance on the very factors that make Australia so good at
routine economic activity may actually retard its ability to cope with the particular
challenges inherent in contemporary innovation.
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This need not be so. Nothing intrinsic to Australian society, geography or
demographics says it cannot develop world-class technology companies. It is not
'too small', 'too isolated' or 'too conservative'. It is not less entrepreneurial than
other developed countries, or less scientifically creative. In aggregate, it has the
human and financial resources. To understand what might be done to build upon
Australia's free-market system - which this writer wholeheartedly supports and
wishes to extend - and to facilitate innovation, it will be useful, first, to provide an
overview of the special characteristics of risk in innovation, then to survey the range
of economic vehicles available to manage economic risk of different kinds, before
finally examining the set of institutions currently employed in Australia. This will
provide a platform for discussing initiatives that might improve Australia's
innovation performance without sacrificing the fundamental national institutions
that have made the core of its economy so strong.
Risk is the defining
challenge of innovation,
By comparison with
day-to-day economic
activity, innovation risk is
present on more fronts and
in greater intensity. While
risk-taking has always been
central to
value creation in capitalism
... innovation poses the
issue of risk
in more forms, and
especially bluntly.
2. The Nature of Innovation Risk
Risk is the defining challenge of innovation. By comparison with day-to-day
economic activity, innovation risk is present on more fronts and in greatet
intensity. While risk-taking has always been central to value creation in
capitalism - indeed, markets themselves have been described as processes
that resolve uncertainty about human needs and the means to satisfy them I
- innovation poses the issue of risk in more forms, and especially bluntly.
Any economic activity, no matter how routine, necessarily calls forth at least
some risk. Neither the actual desires of customers, nor the behaviour of
competitors can be predicted precisely in advance of production. Markets help
resolve this uncertainty. But attempts to innovate induce a far greater level
of risk than is present in routine production. Innovation necessarily implies
grappling with the unknown, not only because prices and quantities of given
commodities cannot be predicted in advance, but also because the technical
qualities and very feasibility of yet-to-be-created products or processes cannot
be known or even described with confidence. Markets that don't yet exist
cannot be analysed. The parameters of risk-taking in innovation are therefore
both more numerous and more severe than those of regular economic activity.
These considerations are vital for understanding the problem economic
institutions must confront as they attempt to innovate. If the nature of
technical problems shifts, so too must the social and organisational vehicles
needed to undertake them. And indeed, the economic and organisational
dimensions of innovation have been changed notably over the last century.
Contemporary technological innovation is enormously more complex and uncertain
than it was a century ago. This has fundamentally altered the character of the
organisational task facing innovators.
Complexity can be defined as the number of elements, and element interactions,
a technical system requires to deliver its intended functionality; and uncertainty
of the degree of perceived inability to predict the future state of these elements
accurately, either because of a lack of information or an inability to discriminate
between relevant and irrelevant data. Both these parameters have risen substantially
over the last century, especially in the technical systems at the centre of innovation.
As the functionality of technology has gtown, so too has the number of components
in the technical systems required to deliver that functionality. In turn, as the
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number of system elements has increased, so too has the range and depth of
technological knowledge needed to master these systems, and individuals have
been forced to become increasingly specialised. Any individual can now master
only a smaller and smaller proportion of the total. Finally, because all the elements
must be integrated to form a coherent whole, the number of elements in the
organisational systems required to undertake innovation has expanded, sometimes
exponentially. A few examples will suffice to illustrate:
•
The size and intensity
of risk inherent in any
innovation project depends
on the structure of
the technology itself.
Innovation risk can be
measured along three
dimensions: scale,
duration and intensity.
components in a typical automobile: 1920 - 1500; 2003 - 30 000
components in an aircraft: 1945 - 20 000; 2003 - 3 500000
components in a handgun: 51 (musket); 140 (riffle)
transistors on a typical chip:1970 - WOO; 1980 - 100000; 2003 -100 000 000.
• ines of code in a software operating system: 1980 - 10 000;
2003 - 80 000 000.
• Interconnects in a Private Branch Exchange (PBX), telephone switching
system: 1950 - lOOO; 1990 - 100000000.
The phenomenon is general; the world really is getting more complex. This rise
in technological complexity and uncertainty, and accordingly in the complexity
of the social systems required to develop technology, has heightened the
inherent risk of innovation. The parameters of risk are multiplied by complexity
and intensified by uncertainty. Complexity magnifies both the real difficulty of
uncertainty management, and its perceived difficulty. By multiplying the
number ofvariables in which unpredictable variation is possible, additional
complexity increases the possibility of technical failure. Bur, in addition, by
multiplying the number of variables of which human managers must take
account, complexity increases the social and cognitive challenge of innovation,
and hence its human-derived risk.
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Thus the size and intensity of risk inherent in any innovation project depends in
the first instance on the structure of the technology itself. Innovation risk can be
measured along three dimensions: scale, duration and intensity. Scale refers to the
minimum necessary investment needed to bring an individual innovation to market.
Duration refers to the minimum period required before an outcome is known.
Intensity refers to the likelihood that the product will make it to market. The greater
the first two factors, and less the third, the greater the project's overall risk.
The innovation scale of a technology depends upon the minimum resource
commitment that must be made to an individual project within it. This is
sometimes referred to as it 'lumpiness'. Lumpiness will be determined by the
minimum efficient scale of the proposed technology, and, again, by its complexity.
Complexity is also a factor in determining the minimum duration required to
complete an innovation project. The more variables that must be tested, and the
more variable interactions that might be important to the technology's functioning,
the longer the time needed to determine its feasibility. Also important in
determining time-commitment is the number of environmental variables with
which the technology must interact, and their criticality.? A new drug, for example,
might not only itself be molecularly complex, but will also be the product of a
complex production system. It will then interact with an even more complex
system - the human body - and be subject to severe demands of criticality, such as
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an exceedingly low rate of side-effects. A company attempting to bring it to market
will also be required to test the molecule, and to document that it has been tested,
under a wide range of potential failure modes. Under such circumstances, the
period required to perform all these tests may extend to many years; in the case
of drug development, to more than 10 years. Because science is pushing ever faster
against its frontiers, and business has moved closer to those frontiers, the
uncertainty inherent in contemporary innovation has escalated.
Innovations closest to the
scientific and technological
frontier will pose the most
extreme risk: the lowest
probability of success, the
largest minimum resource
commitment, and the
longest time frames to
bring them to fruition.
Risk intensity, or (inversely) success probability, is influenced by the maturity of
the science base upon which a new technology relies. Where the science and the
engineering knowledge associated with the technology is mature, the character of
physical elements will be well established, as will the systemic interactions of those
elements. Most electronic projects, for example, rely upon a well-characterised base
of solid-state physics and materials science, and the probability of their technical
feasibility can be predicted with some accuracy. Projects that rely on the
much-less mature biological science base are inherently less certain, and any
individual project is less likely ultimately to succeed.
But success probability for most innovation projects depends on more than just
technical feasibility. Just as important, and often more important, are two other
dimensions of risk: market size and managerial capability. Will the product
appeal to consumers, and to how many? Does the management team and
organisation attempting to devise and perform all the tests required to bring
the product to market possess the required capability? These considerations are
often just as important as whether the device actuality works.
The intensity and location of risk thus varies by industry and technology.
In some sectors, the technology itself is likely to be feasible - to function as
anticipated - bur identifying a market sufficiently large to justify the
investment required to introduce the technology may be problematic. Many
innovation projects in information technology will be of this type. In other
technology types, a market will probably be available, but whether the technology
will operate as anticipated, or can feasibly be scaled from laboratory bench top to
production facility, will be more uncertain. Drug development, and especially
biotechnological projects, are often of this type.
In general, innovations closest to the scientific and technological frontier will pose
the most extreme risk: the lowest probability of success, the largest minimum
resource commitment, and the longest time frames to bring them to fruition. These
considerations help us understand the appropriate risk management vehicle for each
risk type. Not all vehicles are appropriate for all types of risk.
3. How Innovation Risk is Managed
To induce individuals and firms to attempt to create new technologies in the face
of such risks, two factors must be present. First, profits substantially greater than
those to be won from 'normal' economic activity must be on offer. Second, potential
innovators must also be assured at least some degree of protection from the
consequences of failure. The bigger the innovation - that is, the greater the
complexity and the more the uncertainty that must be overcome relative to the
innovator's resources - the greater is the need for such super profits and protection
from catastrophe.
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Successful innovation offers some above-normal profits more or less 'naturally'.
Being first to market with a new product that buyers want provides an opportunity
for (at least temporary) monopoly pricing power. Such super profits will not always,
however, provide sufficient incentive to confront the risk to innovate. An efficiently
functioning market, with technically capable firms, will soon allocate resources to
compete away such profits. Indeed, the more efficient the market, the less incentive
firms face to innovate. One of the simple ways governments encourage innovation is
by blocking the natural action of the market to compete away such super profits, by
extending this period of monopoly through the creation of intellectual property
rights, such as through copyright and patents. Without such market-blocking, the
drug industry, for example, would swiftly implode.
Risk reduction is always difficult in innovation, and usually impossible.
For other types of risk, such as personal injury, the government can prevent
exposure. It can, for example, outlaw dangerous activity. The risk of driving
a car can be reduced by mandating speed limits, imposing quality controls on
automobiles, and even forbidding distractions such as the use of mobile phones
while driving. But such measures are rarely feasible when risk derives from
innovation. The risk in innovation, particularly technical risk, is frequently
irreducible, at least at the outset. Government can, however, reduce market
risk by, for example, guaranteeing to prefer local suppliers over foreign rivals,
or granting tax concessions. It can also attempt to reduce managerial risk by
supporting management training, or encouraging technically skilled personnel
to move from academia.
Protection from the downside, however, does not come naturally. Downside risk
must be managed deliberately, by organisational vehicles designed specifically for
this purpose. Such vehicles can employ one 01' more of only three potential
To induce individuals and tools. They can attempt to reduce risk (by, for example, changing behaviour);
they can hedge it (shift it from the principal innovators to a different group
more able or willing to bear it); or they can clitierJi!y it (spread it across a
wider base). The latter two can be seen as forms of risk reallocation.
firms to attempt to create
new technologies in the
face of such risks, two
factors must be present.
First, profits substantially
greater than those to be
won from 'normal'
economic activity must be
on offer. Second, potential
innovators must also be
assured at least some
degree of protection from
the consequences of failure.
More commonly, however, institutions must manage innovation risk by
hedging or diversification. Hedging attempts to move risk from the
originating party, in this case the innovator, to another who is more able
or willing to bear it. It is thus a form of risk redistribution. Such movement
of the burden of risk is usually accompanied by payment for risk bearing; that is,
others are paid to expose themselves to the risk the originator is not willing to
bear. A market for risk, or more precisely for the time-, intensity- and lumpiness-
adjusted rewards of risk, can thus develop.
Most of those willing to bear such risk, in turn, employ diversification to make the
risk from any specific enterprise tolerable. Diversification works on the principle that
the per-party burden of any given risk declines as more instances are pooled in a
portfolio, and then shared among more risk-bearers. Note that the aggregate amount
of risk in the pool does not change - risk itself has not been reduced, and the same
number of innovation projects will fail as before they were pooled - only the impact
of any losses suffered on particular individuals is reduced by sharing. By the same
token, the per-party opportunity for windfall has been reduced, also by sharing.
16
Innovating Australia
As the complexity and
uncertainty inherent in
technological projects
mounts, so too the scale
and breadth of risk-bearing
entities must escalate.
manage, and at the
extreme, exceedingly so.
Such risk-managing bodies
then become difficult toAs if by magic, however, a little diversification can substantially improve the
odds of gaining at least the $1000 sum for the individual and more
diversification can virtually guarantee it. With two prospectors agreeing to
pool their searches and divide their finds equally, three outcomes are possible:
(1) neither finds any gold (98 per cent); (2) one finds gold worth $100 000,
the other nothing, giving each $50 000 (1.98 per cent); (3) both find gold, giving
each $100 000 (0.01 per cent). Note that the expected value remains $1000 per
prospector. With only two risk-poolers, prospecting is still not particularly
attractive. With 100 prospectors pooling, however, the odds that one will find gold,
bringing the gain of each to at least $1000, grow to a comfortable 63 per cent;
with 1000 prospectors, the odds of at least one finding gold grow to an
overwhelming 99.99 per cent (implying the per-prospector gain is $1(0). The
problem, of course, is that it is exceptionally difficult to organise and sustain
pooling among 1000 grizzled gold prospectors.
The magic of diversification for innovation is that by pooling resources and risks
it makes feasible projects of much greater scale, complexity and uncertainty than
would be possible for any individual. How many individuals could bear the risk
of a space program, for example, even if they could raise the necessary finance?
The drawback, however, is that as the complexity and uncertainty inherent in
technological projects mounts, so too the scale and breadth of risk-bearing entities
must escalate. Such risk-managing bodies then become difficult to manage, and
at the extreme, exceedingly so. In contemporary society, and for some aspects of
science-based industry, the scale required to assume the risk inherent in some
projects has grown from individuals, to partnerships, to organisations, to
governments, and even to multi-government or global bodies.
Fortunately, per-party risk declines sharply with each pooled project and
incremental risk-bearer, even for the out-sized risks stemming from innovation.
A simple example will illustrate the power of large numbers in risk bearing.
Consider a hypothetical gold prospector. Searching for gold is risky, with a low
success probability, let's say, for rhe sake of an example, 1 per cent in any given
year; but it's profitable if successful, let's say $100 000 for the average strike.
The expected value of such an undertaking is therefore $1000 (1 per cent
probability of $100 000, plus 99 per cent probability of nothing). While the
expected value of this undertaking is positive, few citizens in fact turn to gold
prospecting because the risk is too high. A 1 per cent chance of finding gold
means it is overwhelmingly likely that in any given year the prospector will
not realize even $1000, and will waste his or her time. Indeed, it is likely he
or she will derive no income 99 per cent of the time.
The same logic holds for innovation, and also from the opposite direction: the
probability of successfully bringing a particular innovation to market.
Diversification increases the aggregate probability of solving a particular problem.
Consider a hypothetical city facing an innovation problem: a plague of mice and no
effective mousetrap. Let's assume, for the sake of the example, that the probability
any single new trap design will succeed is one in 10, the cost of developing a trap
design is $1000, and the reward of success is $100 000 to the inventor and to the
city a mouse-free environment. The individual inventor thus faces a 90 per cent
probability of losing the $1000 investment in developing the trap, and a 10 per
cent probability of gaining $100 000. The inventor's project thus has an expected
Innovating Australia
17
53
.c
'3
e
c.:l
value of $9100 (10 per cent probability of $100 000 plus 90 per cent of minus
$10(0), and would make sense for the individual to try. But the city would face a
90 per cent probability of not solving its mouse problem, even if it could persuade
the inventor to proceed.
What is the price of this strategy? One trade-off is already apparent in our
gold prospector example. Along with the reduction in risk of failure,
diversification shrinks the probability of gaining a more desirable outcome
than the expected value. Already with only two prospectors, the probability
of gaining $100 000 per prospector had been reduced by 100 times (from
1 per cent to OJn per cent). This explains why gamblers, who play for the love
of risk-taking, rarely pool their activities. It also goes a long way towards
explaining why gold prospectors don't either. For prospectors, the lure of the
big pay-off, however remote a likelihood, provides much of the inducement.
The strategy also requires certain preconditions to have been met. The most
important is that the risks being pooled are truly independent of each other.
If all our prospectors are looking in the same place, or all have been supplied with
similarly rusty prospecting pans, then all are affected by the same factor, and the
actual risk has not been diversified. The 'pooled' risk under these circumstances is
essentially the same as that of the individual. Similarly, if all mouse trap designers
were trained in the same school, and therefore all take a similar approach to a
mouse plague, the teal probability of finding a solution will not be increased by
pooling. The need to meet such preconditions points to the difficulties economic
institutions face in coping with innovation risk.
Now consider a circumstance in which the city commissions more inventors to try
their hand at designing a mouse trap. Under the same assumptions as before (l0 per
cent success probability per project), the city now has more attractive alternatives.
With two inventors working on the problem, it has a 19 per cent chance of
someone building an effective trap; with 10 a 65 per cent chance, and with a 100
a 99.99 per cent chance. The problem is, of course, that the market for mousetraps
is still only estimated at $100 000. With 100 projects underway, the city makes
no profit, but its mouse problem is solved. Interestingly, halving the number of
inventors at work, to 50, reduces the probability of success only to 99.5 per cent;
dropping the number to 30 reduces the probability to 95.8 per cent. Thus, by
The fact that risk can diversifying even modestly, the city enjoys an overwhelming likelihood of both
solving its mouse problem, and of making a profit of doing so.be managed in these
ways, that some economic
actors are better than
others at bearing risk, and
that profit can be made
from managing risk,
implies that a market for
risk services will develop.
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4. Markets as Risk Managers for Innovation
The fact that risk can be managed in these ways, that some economic actors are
better than others at bearing risk, and that profit can be made from managing risk,
implies that a market for risk services will develop. This is as true for innovation
as for other forms of risk. Some economic actors can potentially be better risk
managers than others for two reasons. The first is that they might be better able
to diversify. They may be larger, or have access to a wider range of independent
projects than others. Banks and insurance companies, for example, rely on this
advantage to enable them to assume risk from individuals. Larger companies can
spread the risk across a greater number of bets. Venture capitalists also rely on size
to share risk with entrepreneurs. Second, some economic actors may be better than
others at choosing projects for inclusion in a risk-management portfolio. Specialist
risk managers cultivate expertise and experience at judging and balancing the
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impact levels, and
portfolio balancing.
Other reasons why
markets develop for
innovation risk include
differential risk aversion
levels, including those
due to differential risk
multi-sided risk inherent in innovation projects. Venture capitalists are (or should
be) much better at assessing the market and managerial risk in new ventures than
are individual entrepreneurs themselves.
In addition, however, some may actually be able to reduce the risk in a particular
innovation project. How might this be achieved? For a firm with deeper scientific,
technical, or managerial capabilities, the risk inherent in a particular project might
be substantially lower than for another lacking those capabilities. When a
pharmaceutical company buys the rights to a candidate drug from a biotech start-up,
for example, it can actually reduce the risk that the product will fail to reach the
market by combining its own capabilities with those of the project team or initial
sponsoring company. The chance that a start-up biotech company can not only invent
a potential new drug, but also successfully manage the complex process of clinical
trials, interact effectively with regulatory agencies, scale up manufacturing processes,
and distribute the product through a nationwide or global distribution channel,
are much less than those of an established pharmaceutical company. By taking
over the project, and plugging it into its own development portfolio, the
company has effectively reduced the project's risk.
Other reasons why markets develop for innovation risk include differential
risk aversion levels, including those due to differential risk impact levels,
and portfolio balancing. Risk aversion levels vary either simply because some
parties are less fearful of risk - a few actually enjoy risk - or because some
(for example, the rich) are more capable of withstanding the impact of losses,
especially at the margins. Those with greater fear of risk can then attempt to
'sell' the risk to others who are more comfortable with it. In innovation, this
might take the form of parrnering, outsourcing certain activities, or pre-selling
the yet-to-be-realised product to a major customer.
But parties might agree to exchange risks simply in order to re-weight their
portfolios, and align time periods. Firms processing raw materials for which year-
round capacity utilisation is important, for example, seek to balance the price they
pay for inputs, so as not to face price spikes in non-harvest periods. They do this by
buying and selling futures contracts from others, including farmers, who may seek
to 'lock in' stable prices for their products in advance of harvests.
All these are powerful reasons why different economic actors will seek to trade and
exchange risk. And indeed, this desire has generated a wide variety of tools,
techniques and vehicles for buying and selling risk: bank loan portfolios, put and
call contracts, a dazzling array of derivative contracts, insurance contracts and so on.
In turn, the creation and spectacular growth in recent times of these instruments
has spawned a wide variety of markets for trading risk. These include the Chicago
Board of Trade Futures Exchange, and many markets for options and other
derivatives of stocks, loans and currencies.
Some economists have been led by this proliferation of instruments and exchanges
to hope that all risk, including risk in innovation, can be managed through market
exchange. It is a laudable hope, since indeed if all risk could be managed through
markets, the organisational and managerial overhead would be much lower, and the
results would be more available to entrepreneurs. Life for innovators would be much
simpler. The only role for other institutions, and policymakers, would be to support
markets, and to help them be as liquid, transparent and flexible as possible.
Innovating Australia
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But in order that markets for risk come into being, several conditions must be met.
Of central importance are conditions relating to the availability of ~nform~t~on '.In
essence, the same information must be accessible to all actors. If this condition IS
breached, buyers and sellers cannot reliably estimate the degree of risk inherent in
any position, and cannot establish a real value for the risk management instrument.
Similarly, for markets ro establish a price for the instruments, these instruments must
be made sufficiently similar in key respects that they can be compared effectively.
Adverse selection occurs when rhe sellers of risk know more about the degree
of jeopardy involved in a particular transaction than do buyers. The result may
be that the most risky projects are sold too cheaply; the worst risks 'select
themselves' for inclusion in the sale portfolio (hence, the term 'adverse
selection,' from the point of view of the risk buyer) - this is to the
disadvantage of risk managers. Sellers keep the best, least risky, projects to
themselves. Frequently, adverse selection results in risk managers discovering
that rather than managing an unbiased portfolio of independent risks, which
is, as we have noted, a necessary condition for enabling diversification to
function effectively, they have accumulated a group biased towards the most
risky. When buyers fear adverse selection, they retreat, and the market for the
type of risk subject to this defect crumbles.
Unfortunately, in markets for risk, and as we will see, especially markets for
innovation risk, such conditions are frequently not met, and cannot be met. Several
factors combine to inhibit the growth of markets for risk, particularly of certain
types and under certain conditions. Two widely observed defects in the information
surrounding risk available to market participants undermine the action of markets.
These are commonly termed adverse selection and mora! hazard. Both are virulently
present around innovation, and lead to severe information asymmetries in the
markets for knowledge and technology risk.
hazard - undermine the
action of markets.
Several factors combine
to inhibit the growth of
markets for risk. Two
widely observed defects
in the information
surrounding risk available
to market participants -
adverse selection and moral
Whether a problem of this type might exist in markets for knowledge was
tested by Harvard Professor Gary Pisano in the arena of biotechnology. \ Pisano
found it did exist. He rook a 1970 article by Berkeley economist George Akerlof,"
in which Akerlof framed what has become known as the 'lemons' problem, and used
data from R&D alliances in biotechnology to test for evidence of the problem
Akerlof postulated. Akerlof's argument was that in transactions in which the parties
could access differing levels of information - that is, in which information was
'asymmetric' (Akerlof's example was used cars) - buyers could not tell the difference
between a good product and a defective one. Only the seller of a used car, and not
the buyer, really knows whether the shine of the hood conceals unrevealed defects.
In this circumstance, Akerlof argued, even if the car was in fact good, buyers would
discount all cars in the used market, compensating for the risk that the particular
one they were buying concealed unsuspected defects.
The size of the discount would be derived from the expected probability that the
particular car the buyer gets will be a 'lemon'. If the expected probability of
unwittingly purchasing a lemon is 50 per cent, the buyer will discount the
purchase price by 50 per cent of the difference in value between a 'good' car and a
'lemon'. The result of such (rational) behaviour is a severe distortion of the market.
If the seller of a good car knows that his or her offering will sell for 50 per cent less
than its true value, due to the presence of lemons elsewhere in the market, he or she
will be less likely to sell it at all. Conversely, potential sellers of 'lemons' can be
confident that their offerings will go for 50 per cent more than true value, and they
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behaviour, or even to cheat,
once the risk of doing so has
been sold to another party.
will have a greater incentive to sell 'lemons'. Eventually, only 'lemons' will
be available on the used car market, and the market will collapse.
Pisano argued that in licensing deals among biotechnology companies, the
prospective licensee does not know the true quality of the project on offer. He or
she may have difficulty in finding out. While the licensee can conduct extensive due
diligence, inevitably some critical information will not be passed across to buyers,
either because the seller is unwilling to do so or because they are unable to. The
seller clearly wants to present the project in as favourable a light as possible. Indeed,
were the seller to hand over all information, the licensee would have little need to
pay anything for the license, having already obtained the needed information.
Under such circumstances, licensees must discount how much they are willing to
pay for licenses, and the 'lemons' dynamic potentially kicks in. To test whether it in
fact did kick in, Pisano analysed data on 260 biotechnology projects. He asked
whether licensed projects suffered a statistically significant lower success rate
than non-licensed projects, all other factors being taken into account. He found
that partnered projects were only 46 per cent as likely to succeed as non-
partnered. This is a large difference. It implies that eliminating the 'lemons'
effect could effectively double the success rate in partnered projects. The
implication was clear: the market foe knowledge is likely to be inhibited as more
firms experience the 'lemons' problems with projects they in-license. Innovation
risk is thus more difficult to manage through intellectual property markets.
The second major problem of asymmetric information, moral hazard, results
from the creation of an incentive to undertake more risky behaviour, or even
to cheat, once the risk of doing so has been sold to another party. The classic
example given by economists is fire insurance. Once property owners are
assured that the consequences to them of a catastrophic fire have been sufficiently
reduced or eliminated through insurance, they may reduce their commitment to, and
expenditure on, fire reduction equipment and practices. At the extreme, they may
even deliberately create fires to reap the reward of having sold the risk to the insurer.
This problem is especially important for innovation. The gains from innovation
come from activities and projects that are inherently risky. What constrains
innovators from pushing forward with risk is the consequences of failure -loss of
their investment and the time committed to the project. If any agency effectively
'insures' the innovator against all risk, whether it be an investor, a bank, or a
government, while leaving the potential innovator in control of key decisions, the
potential exists for the innovator to skew their projects towards only the most risky.
With the downside taken care of by someone else, why not shoot for a big upside?
While the 'insurer', particularly if it is a government, may in fact be attempting to
encourage innovators to be more adventurous, completely removing risk may tempt
the innovator towards excessive risk-taking.
The two problems outlined here are well recognised by economists and historians
of markets. They are both information problems, in which incentives exist for
parties on one or both sides of a transaction not to share information. The
consequence of information asymmetry is to undermine the willingness and ability
of market participants to buy and sell risk. Its presence means that markets for
knowledge Cintellectual property') rarely function smoothly. Even good ideas are so
heavily discounted that innovators frequently fail to gain sufficient returns to
justify the resource commitment required to undertake them.
Innovating Australia
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The application (:f the insurance principle, conuertino a lm:\!cr contingent
loss into a smaller fixed chargc, depends upon the measurement (!(
probability on the basis 4 afairly accurate ,\!rtnlping into classes. 7
Innovation is clearly in Knight's second category. This is a critical distinction
for economic practice:
The best example (!f uncertainty is in connection with the exercise ~f
judgment or the [ormation of opinions as to the future course o] events,
which opinions (and not scientific knowledge) actually guide most 40111'
conduct. Now if the distribution of the d!1Terel1t possible outcomes in a
group of instances is known, it is possible to get rid 4 any real
uncertainty by the expedient (~f<,?rol/ping or 'consolidating' instances. <i
Knight argued that if the probabilities could not be known in advance, the
tools of 'consolidation' or the 'insurance principle' - through portfolio
diversification such as that discussed above would prove much less reliable:
For innovation, such 'measurement of probability' and 'grouping into classes'
is rarely possible. Innovation projects are by nature learning and knowledge-
creation efforts. As such, each is unique. It is all the more important, therefore,
that risk managers be able to make precisely informed judgments abrlJlt each
specific case. Doing this across organisational boundaries is always more difficult
than within the shared culture and cognitive frame of a common organisation,
at least if that organisation is healthy. The conclusion is that market-mediated
inter-organisational relations inevitably inhibit, sometimes severely, the intimate
knowledge and close relations essential to both knowledge integration and project
selection for risk management. Escalating complexity and uncertainty have only
exacerbated the difficulties to which Knight drew our attention.
The information-processing demands of innovation, however, ind:lCe ~l11other whole
class of problem that retards the smooth functioning of markets tor risk. ~hese are
problems, not of information asymmetry but of inf~r.n:ation abJ:ence. The vital
distinction between situations in which the probabllwes of vartous outcomes can
be known in advance, and hence managed with confidence through pooling and
diversification techniques such as those discussecl above, and those in which
probabilities cannot be known in advance, was first highlighted by Unive~'si~y
of Chicago economist Frank Knight. Knight proposed two conceptually distinct
categories, risk and uncertainty, for understanding what is commonly lumped
together as 'risk', and suggested important implications for his distinction:
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty,
is that in the [ormer the distribution 4 the 01ltCOl11C in a <l?roup 4
instances is known (either throl/<,?h calculation a priori orjrom statistics
4 past experience), while in the case 4 lit/certainty that is not true, the
reason being ill general that it is impossible to form a xroup 4 instances,
because the situation dealt with is in such a high degree unique."
achieve such risk-sharing
have succeeded in
innovating in the complex
and uncertain fields of
In no successful economy
is innovation risk managed
by markets alone .. ,.
Nations that have
succeeded in establishing
sets of institutions to
software, electronics and
the life sciences. Those that
haven't developed such
'national systems of
innovation' have failed to
build those industries.
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To summarise, the growth of markets for risk is retarded in the case of innovation
by three factors: inability to arrive at an agreed price due to asymmetric
information; adverse selection leading to excessive discounting; and difficulty
conducting learning and integration across organisational boundaries. These
problems have meant that markets for intellectual property are flawed and poorly
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developed, and in no successful economy is innovation risk managed by markets
alone. It has proven necessary for innovation risk to be shared by institutions
broader than the modern corporation. Nations that have succeeded in establishing
sets of institutions to achieve such risk-sharing, without inducing adverse selection
or moral hazard, have succeeded in innovating in the complex and uncertain fields
of software, electronics and the life sciences. Those that haven't developed such
'national systems of innovation' have failed to build those industries.
5. Risk Management Vehicles
The growth of markets
for risk is retarded in the
case of innovation by three
factors: inability to arrive at
an agreed price due to
asymmetric information;
adverse selection leading
to excessive discounting;
and difficulty conducting
learning and integration
across organisational
boundaries.
If markets can't bear the burden of innovation risk alone, who can? In fact, no one
best vehicle exists that is optimal for all technologies. Because the structure of risk
varies, so too must the structure and organisational form of risk management. Some
types of risk require large and diverse management vehicles, others small and
tightly integrated organisations. To manage innovation risk successfully, it is
necessary to match the source of finance with the type of risk to be incurred.
Greater scale means that larger individual minimum commitments must be
made to participate in the experimentation process, which implies a larger
porrfolio. Greater risk intensity, or lower individual successful probabilities,
must be offset by higher potential pay-offs. Longer durarion means positions
must be maintained for longer before a return can be expected, and often
require ongoing rather than limited-lifespan vehicles.
Put simply, the greater the scale of commitment necessary, the lower the
individual probability of success (greater the risk intensity), and the longer the
duration of experimentation processes, the wider must be the base over which
the risk-management vehicle must diversify. Vehicles to manage minimal risk
are relatively straightforward to construct, and many nations possess them. But
it is important to recognise that the vehicles required to manage larger, more
intense and more prolonged risk must be larger, more complex and of longer
duration. Fewer nations have been unable to construct these.
This fact explains why some nations are outstanding at entrepreneurship but
poor at technological innovation, or vice versa, strong in invention but poor
at entrepreneurship. In fact, most entrepreneurs don't innovate. Their new
businesses create a 'me-roo' product or service, incurring little technical risk.
They start small and remain small, although such businesses can provide a generous
income to an individual entrepreneur. While small, 'me-too' firms are numerous,
they often enjoy only a relatively short lifespan. They contribute little to the
growth of a modern capitalist economy, and little to technological innovation, Such
ventures can be, and are, funded from undiversified personal resources, or from
family and friends. Even for firms that eventually grow larger, most initial finance
comes from undiversified sources.
But these businesses, too, while they might at the outset be financed from personal
savings, as they grow and take on more ambitious innovation projects, they demand
both more finance and more-diverse finance. Most such firms take several years to
define a particular field in which they possess distinctive competence. During this
period, their customers implicitly agree to share their risk. Most such companies
succeed by 'out-hustling' others with similar ideas, though a few develop rapidly
based on distinctive ideas from the outset." Such firms typically must live for five
to eight years before, if successful, they develop any competence that would merit
23
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formal venture financing. They also are often financed at first with a combination
of personal assets and aggregated friends and family assets.
As risks become larger, of longer duration, and of greater intensity, increasingly
broad organiJationctl coordination is necessary if risk is to be effectively diversified.
The range of possible risk-management and integration vehicles can be arrayed
along a spectrum, from the simple and small scale, through to the large and
complex. If the demands of particular innovation tasks are not matched to
appropriate institutional and organisational vehicles, innovation will appear
unacceptably risky and not be attempted.
The three main vehicles for financing innovation investment in a modern
economy are: large corporations, including banks; venture capital and other
pools of private investors; and government. At an early stage, formal equity
and debt markets - the stock and bond markets - usually play little role.
In almost no country other than Australia does the stock market attempt to
finance innovation, especially in its early phases. Such markets usually become
involved only much later, serving to enable the successful entrepreneur to
monetise his or her investment and capital gains, and withdraw funds from
both through an initial public offering. These vehicles play the vital roles of
diversifying risk and overcoming information asymmetry to select investments.
But each enjoys a divergent set of strengths, and suffers different weaknesses.
For initially larger and/or riskier undertakings, sources of capital that appear small
in the bigger picture assume much greater importance. Such ventures usually
require finance beyond the reach of most individuals, and very likely beyond the
resources of those who initiated the idea that spawns the company. These
The three main vehicles ventures are much riskier, and frequently require longer time frames before
ideas either come to fruition or are shown to fail. To cope with such demands,
entrepreneurs must turn to investors who can mobilise greater resources, and
diversify the risk further.
for financing innovation
investment in a modern
economy are: large
corporations, including
banks; venture capital
and other pools of private
investors; and government
In almost no country
other than Australia
does the stock market
attempt to finance
innovation, especially
in its early phases.
large corporations can usually gain superior information about the character
of innovation projects. In theory at least, they have full access to the data and
judgments generated by their employees on the risks and potential returns of
innovation projects under consideration. They can also combine and integrate
information, in an ongoing and cumulative social learning process, over time
expanding their capability both to manage and to assess such projects. Their
information flow is, of course, subject to the vicissitudes of organisational politics _
empire-building, career-positioning, pleasing the boss and so on - but by keeping
information internal to the organisation, calling upon the effort and commitment
of employees, and holding employees accountable for their performance over time,
large corporations do have a better chance to acquire the information needed to
select the best projects for inclusion in their portfolio.
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On the disadvantage side of the ledger, such a portfolio will necessarily be
circumscribed in several ways. First, the number of projects included cannot grow
very large. A company can conceivably manage tens, perhaps even hundreds of
projects, but not thousands. Second, the aggregate resources that can be committed
will be limited by the firm's size, its cash flow, and industry norms about the
appropriate ratio of sales to R&D expenditure. Third, to achieve the advantages of
knowledge integration, and to make project management effective, firms must not
Innovating Australia
diversify too far from their core expertise. Management must know enough and
have sufficient experience ro make informed judgments about the projects selected
for their porrfolio. Equity and bond markets are sceptical of firms that attempt ro
expand into arenas in which the firm lacks established competence and experience.
Fourth, public firms, in particular, need ro satisfy the short-term cash-flow interests
of their investors. Given the favourable tax treatment that prevails for dividends, in
Australia especially, investors in public firms expect that management will payout
a large proportion of earnings to shareholders, limiting what can be retained for
investment in future innovation. Tbey also expect that firms will not undertake
activities that are disproportionately more risky than those in the operational core.
practice how much true
diversification a public firm
can achieve for innovation
projects: the projects must
be related reasonably closely
to the firm's core activities,
they must not be too risky
or too different, there must
not be too many of them,
and the quantity of
resources retained for
These four factors limit in practice how much true diversification a public firm can
achieve for innovation projects: the projects must be related reasonably closely to
the firm's core activities, they must not be toO risky or too different, there must
not be too many of them, and the quantity of resources retained for investment
in innovation must not be roo great. In short, while corporations can usually Four factors limit in
enjoy access to better information than markets, the breadth of diversification
tban can be achieved without jeopardising relations with markets is inherently
limited. Corporations thus are most capable at managing medium-sized
portfolios of related projects, none of which is too large or risky by comparison
to the firm itself. Ideally, their projects would be closely related to, and they
would leverage and strengthen the firm's core operational activities.
Venture capital is the second organisational form through which innovation
risk is managed in free-market economies. Venture capital pools differ from
companies, in that they seek to invest in entirely new, potentially high-
growth, businesses, grow them, and sell their stakes when mature, rather
than manage them over the long term. These young businesses can be quite
unrelated to one another; indeed, from the perspective of achieving true
diversification - unrelated risks - it is ideal that they are quite different. But
venture capitalists differ from other pooled investment funds in that they seek
to add their own expertise about growing small companies to those of existing
management teams, improving the probability that their firms will succeed.
The lifespan of a venture fund is finite, usually seven years. Other investment investment in innovation
groups, such as pension funds or wealthy individuals, commit a proportion, must not be too great.
usually a small proportion, of their resources to the venture fund in the hope
of gaining far above average returns, more than compensating for the extra risk
they assume. Venture funds range in size from a few million dollars to about
a billion. Venture capitalists hope to make investments in a limited number
of companies, typically 10 to 30, of a few million dollars each, Tbeir goal is to
recognise opportunities that others do not, buy a stake early, help mature these
businesses, and ultimately bring their products to market, before selling their stake
for a large gain. This process is, of course, inherently high risk. By investing in
businesses that have yet to prove themselves in actual markets, venture capitalists
accept, and hope to master, a high degree of risk.
How do they do this? To what types of risk are venture capitalists best suited? In
essence, venture capitalists aim to combine more diversification than companies
can gain with better knowledge than equity markets of opportunities for business
growth. Venture capitalists aspire to know more than markets - to see the
opportunities faster, apply better skills to analyse opportunities, and employ
Innovating Australia
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specialise in understanding
market and managerial
issues. They are rarely
qualified to assess or
cope with technical risk.
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superior management expertise to help their businesses grow - and to pool
a sufficient range of investments that the inevitable failures are more than
compensated for by the winners.
But, like all other risk-management vehicles, venture capitalists are expert in
only certain types of businesses and certain types of risk. They specialise in
understanding market and managerial issues. They are rarely qualified to assess
or cope with technical risk. Unlike companies, therefore, most venture capitalists
attempt to remove or substantially reduce technological risk before committing
to an investment. Discussions between technological entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists typically begin with at least 'proof of concept': demonstration chat the
device, software program, or service will actually function as claimed.
In the fields in which venture capital has flourished, in particular information
technology, software and telecommunication devices, these conditions can be
Like all other risk- met. It is usually possible to show at the outset that the proposed concept of
a young company is technically feasible and practical, at least in principle. A
working prototype or mock-up can be assembled. The underlying physics and
engineering ate usually well characterised. This is true as well of electronics
and the semiconductor industry.
In these fields, other parameters amenable to venture funds are also met.
Projects typically take less than five years to bring to fruition or to fail. This is
critical for venture funds, for in the seven-year lifespan of a typical fund, one or
two years will be devoted to finding suitable investments, and one or two yeats
will be expended at the end to exit positions (successful or otherwise). That
leaves only three to five years in which their firms must be tested. And in the
industries in which venture capital has thrived the individual investments are
not too large. If a typical fund invests $100 million, and wants 20 positions,
each investment cannot average more than $5 million. This profile nicely fits
the typical software company. It can be financed for a few million, takes a few
years to test, and its technology can be well described in advance of financing
the new firm. Of course, venture funds Can combine their investments with
others, but it is difficult to fund projects chat require hundreds of millions of
dollars, or many years, in this way.
The limits of venture capital are not apparent in the other major field of
contemporary technological innovation: life sciences. Here, conditions amenable
to venture capital are much less commonly achieved. First, technical risk cannot
be taken off the table, Most life science projects and new companies come into
being precisely to determine whether the company's concept will prove technically
feasible. The underlying science is not mature or well understood, and scientific
outcomes must be established by physical experimentation. Thus, in life sciences,
potential investors confront irreducible risk of all three kinds. Assessing the kind
of technical risk frequently encountered in life sciences demands deep and
sophisticated knowledge of the focused sub-field within which the project will
operate. And even with such knowledge, as in the case of scientific peer review,
it is often possible to gain only an imprecise estimate of a project's success
potential. Detailed familiarity with the current state of relevant literature, as well
as knowledge of activity under way at leading labs worldwide, is often required
to assess such projects. Certainly, very few venture capitalists, even those with
advanced scientific training in a field of biology, are likely to possess the exact
expertise required to estimate success probabilities in this field.
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Further limitations are imposed upon venture capitalists in biotechnology by the
typical size of their funds, the number of positions they wish to hold, and therefore
the maximum size of commitment they consider it prudent to make to anyone
nascent company. These parameters will be driven by the venture capitalist's
assessment of the success probability or risk intensity of the projects in which they
will invest. For example, a $300 million fund, investing $10 million in each of 30
projects, with a potential payoff of three times initial investment, would need at
least 10 successful projects (or 33 per cent success rate) to return its investments
with no profit. To gain an industry-expected return of 40 per cent, the fund would
need at least 14 successful projects (a 47 per cent success rate). If the expected
success rate drops to 5 per cent (the rate many analysts think typical of
pharmaceutical projects entering clinical trials), the return on the few successful
projects must rise to 200 times to return the fund's capital, and 280 times to gain
a 40 per cent return. Even if achievable, this is a highly skewed distribution of
risk and returns,
Clearly, these are severe conditions to impose on any investment portfolio, The
implication is that the minimum effective scale of a fund - the breadth of
diversity it requires 1'0 be confident of meeting its targets - will be driven by a
combination of the risk intensity (success probability) typical of the technology
in which it seeks to invest, the minimum size of investment required, and the
expected return for winners. Lower probabilities dictate greater diversification
and larger total fund size. But even when these conditions are met, some very
profitable investments offering potential returns many times their original
invested capital may not be wise, under conditions of exceptionally low (but
not unheard of) expected success rates.
The final major vehicle available to finance innovation is government.
Government brings to the innovation challenge several major advantages
over other risk-management contenders, along with two central weaknesses.
The most obvious advantage is that government can diversify its risk over
the widest base of all: the entire citizenry. Not only can it achieve huge
diversification, but it can also broaden its capital raising, incorporating means from
raising taxes to issuing its own debt. It can also diversify the form in which it take
its returns to include non-financial forms, such as more and better employment,
better health ourcomes, improved security, or simply enhanced national prestige
and the betterment of humanity. On top of these advantages, it can readily rake a
long-term perspective, both in the investments it makes and in the way it finances
them. Government would seem, then, to be an ideal risk-bearer, especially for large,
complex and long-term projects. And indeed, government has often financed such
projects, ranging from the space program, to Airbus, the new commercial-aircraft
manufacturer in Europe, to laying the foundation for a semiconductor industry in
Japan, Taiwan and Singapore.
But government suffers from two important drawbacks as a risk-taker, both
stemming from the character of its resource-allocation and decision-making
processes. First, precisely because government possesses such a broad range of
responsibilities and powers, and can bear and survive large-scale risk - indeed, if
it is the government of a significant economy, it can survive almost any financial
risk - it can suffer from inherent discipline problems. Government can potentially
invest in almost any project, even those with virtually no chance of success, and
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survive the consequences. Worse still, government, and especially non-elected
government officials, face no competition. Government is si~1ply not, subject to
the same market-based discipline as other risk-managers, or indeed virtually emy
discipline other than the public's scrutiny and willingness to bear taxes. It is a
perfect monopoly. One consequence of all this is that government is partiCLlI~rly
vulnerable to allocating resources to projects characterised by not only great risk, but
little or no social pay-off.9 This is especially so when such projects help politicians
win re-election, either because they are popular or supported by wealthy backers.
The result is that government resource allocation can be deeply flawed. Key
individuals in government rarely bear any risk on their own account; they are
playing with other people's money. While in a democracy at least they need to
retain public support, because government can readily delay financing its
investment until after the current decision-makers have departed, governments can
allocate resources in ways that are popular today, bur make little long-term
sense. Frequently, too, these decisions are made by personnel with poor
training or experience in financial risk management. A capital allocation
system in which successful projects are those backed by friends of government
officials or politicians is perhaps the worst form of risk-management available.
And the greater the arena of responsibility allocated to government, the greater
the probability such disaster will emerge.
How might such drawbacks be surmounted, to gain the advantages of
government as a risk-bearer, but avoid the distorting effects of government
decision-making processes? The answer is in the first place to circumscribe
government's role to areas in which the market, or market-oriented vehicles,
have been demonstrated not to work (that is, in which markets and other
institutions fail, and not because they are simply bad ideas), and then to
require both transparency and the strongest possible competition in resource
allocation. Ideally, after broad public debate government would decide which
areas of risk it shollld bear in the interests of social welfare, and then hand over
decision-making on individual projects to a group or groups that are exposed
to both public scrutiny and competition. The first condition requires that it be
firmly established that the type of risk under consideration should be borne by
someone - that is, that the potential project offers substantial social pay-off if
deeply flawed. successful - and that no other vehicle can do so, whether because the risk
cannot be diversified, is too long term, or jusr too complex. The second
condition requires that government officials themselves not make risk-management
investment and resource-allocation decisions, but that purpose-designed vehicles be
developed for these tasks. One key is for government not to bear all risk, but only
to share it with market exposed vehicles.
An Example: The Pharmaceutical Industry
The fact that the structures of risk and appropriate management vehicles vary
suggests that in large and complex sectors, such as health or defence, a division of
labour will arise among various institutions for bearing risk. The pharmaceutical
industry of the United States, the world leader in this sector, provides an instructive
example of how one such system divides responsibility.
Bringing a new drug to market requires successful navigation of a multi-stage,
time-consuming and labyrinthine process. In 2004, the cost of developing and
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testing a new drug was estimated to be greater than $1 billion, and to take more
than 10 years. These two features alone suggest the need for both large and patient
sources of capital. But in addition, drug development is highly risky, and returns
come from only a very few successful projects. Ninety-five per cent of drug
candidates entering clinical trials fail to gain final approval and don't get to market.
And immediately successful drugs come off patent, imitators produce generic copies
and prices plummet. Yet, year after year the pharmaceutical industry is on average
among the most profitable in the world. This fact implies that the 5 per cent of
new drug candidates that do make it to market can deliver very large sales and high
margins. In other words, while new products produce sufficiently strong profits to
make the industry one of the fastest growing and highest margin in the world, for
the industry taken as a whole, risk is lumpy, long-term, and returns are highly
skewed.
Significantly for the present discussion, the industry cannot be considered as
a single entity. Each of the risk parameters discussed above varies as a drug
candidate moves through the stages of the R&D process. The likelihood of a
product succeeding rises as it crosses key hurdles, as is illustrated in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Launch probability and project numbers in the
pharmaceutical industry
-------- -----------------
Number of projects for probablity of one launch
33333 10 000 100 20 5 2
Probability of market introduction from stage:
0.003% 0,01% 1% 5% 20% 50%
~
Target Lead Preclinical Phase I Phase /I Phase Iii Market
generation generation trials clinicals clinicals clinicals iaunch
(Source: Author's estimates)
The fact that the
structures of risk and
appropriate management
vehicles vary suggests that
in large and complex
sectors, such as health
or defence, a division of
labour will arise among
various institutions for
bearing risk.
During the earliest stages, in which scientists search for target molecules in the
biochemical chains that cause disease (a process known in the industry as 'target
generation') and then look for active molecules that can disrupt those disease-inducing
chains Clead generation'), the probability of any individual project producing a
successful drug is exceedingly low, in fact on the order of 1 in 33 000 (for target
generation) or 1 in 10 000 (for lead generation). As candidates move into preclinical
(animal trials) stage, the odds of success rise to 1 in 100; then in clinical trials (testing
in humans) the odds rise from 1 in 20 for Phase 1 (which tests in a small sample
whether the drug is safe), to 1 in 5 for Phase II (which tests efficacy, also in a small
sample), to 1 in 2 for Phase III trials (a large, statistically significant sample). The
process from preclinicals to Phase III clinicals typically takes about 10 years.
By combining this information on probabilities with the cost of undertaking such
projects, it is possible to estimate the degree of diversification required to manage
risk adequately. The cost of bringing a single product through Phase II clinical
trials is estimated to be US$50 million; and through the end of Phase III,
US$500-800 million. Prior to clinical trials, projects are much smaller and cheaper,
bur many more are required. To ensure a likelihood of one project getting to
market from the lead and target generation stage, tens of thousands of projects
29
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must be initiated, at a cost of billions of dollars. To be likely to succeed in. t,:king
a single potential new drug from Phase I through to the end of Phas~ II cltnJ~al
trials, an organisation needs to start about 20 (carefully selected) projects, which
if they did cost our estimated average $50 million each (some dr~p out before Phase
II, of course, providing some savings), it would suggest a portfolio of around..
$1 billion. To take the drugs through to the end of Phase III calls for an additional
commitment of around $1 billion, bringing the total portfolio to around $2 billion.
What sort of organisations can manage a risk of such magnitude? Clearly, a division
of labour is required. How the US innovation system divides the tasks is outlined
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Risk management division of labour in the
pharmaceutical industry
Risk manager
Government and
Not-for-profits
Portfolio 10 ODDs
projects.
$10s billions.
Project selection on
basis of science.
Risk manager
Venture capital and
pharmaceuticai companies.
Portfolio 10s-1 ODs projects
$1005 millions.
Project selection on
commercial and science basis.
Risk manager
Pharmaceutical
companies.
Portfolio<10 projects
$2-4 billions.
Project selection on
commerdal basis.
Number of projects for probablity of one launch
33333 10000 100 20 5 2
Probability of market introduction from stage:
0.003% 0.01% 1% 5% 20% 50%
-------------------------,p...-
Target Lead Preclinical Phase I Phase II Phase ill Market
generation generation trials clinicals clinicals clinicals launch
(Source: Author's estimates)
No single organisation could possibly operate and coordinate tens of thousands of
projects, at a cost in the billions of dollars, other than the government, which in the
United States combines with an extensive network of nor-for-profit organisations
such as the leading research universities to shoulder the task. The US government
overcomes the drawbacks of the government resource-allocation process referred to
above, not by refusing to 'pick winners' (in Australian parlance) or absenting itself,
in the hope the market will pick up the ball, but by selecting a sector, in this
instance biology, then 'outsourcing' resource-allocation decisions to a decentralised
network of scientific peer-review panels. These panels attempt to ensure that the
money flows to the most scientifically promising projects, and that results and
prospects are reviewed by those closest to the field. The system is, of course, far
from perfect - it is subject to personality politics, entrenched interests, distortions
due to professional jealousy, and many other pressures - but by and large it works.
The result is that the United States has a commanding lead in basic science, and a
proliferation of prospects for new drugs. Note that at this stage the US system does
not attempt to rely on equity markets to finance research and developmenr.
At the next stage, in which tens of projects are needed to gain sufficient
diversification, matters are less clear. Venture capital is certainly active in financing
early clinical trials for promising candidates in the United States, as are
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pharmaceutical companies. But even in an economy the size of the United States,
few venture capital organisations can build a $1 billion portfolio of drug development
projects. This stage of the development chain is therefore still problematic, and it is
the arena in which many of the difficulties cited in the previous section surface most
noticeably. Without strong ties to pharmaceutical companies, it is unlikely this phase
of the development process could adequately be funded, even in the United States.
For stage III clinical trials and beyond, to marketing and distribution, only the
pharmaceutical companies can both make the required judgments and finance a
sufficiently large portfolio. The rising cost of the complex and expensive clinical
trials now required to meet regulatory approval, and hence the even greater size of
project portfolio required to diversify the risk, is certainly one factor behind the
merger wave experienced by the global pharmaceutical industry in the late 1990s.
The calculations cited above apply to any typical pharmaceutical product,
whether biotech-derived or traditional small-molecule chemistry. But the
pharmaceutical industry is only one example of such a division of labour. The
important insight here is that no one-best, one-size fits all, mechanism exists
for innovation risk management in a modern economy. What works best for
the barber shop or family construction company will be unlikely to serve the
needs of a new commercial aircraft manufacturer. As the balance between risk
and reward tilts and narrows, and the degree of technical expertise required
expands, the base over which risk must be diversified widens. It shifts from
individuals, to families, to small-pooled vehicles such as angel funds, to
medium-sized pooled funds such as venture-capitalists, and then to very large
pooled funds such as pension funds, and ultimately to government itself.
The kinds of institutional structures a society develops for managing risk plays
a determinative role in shaping in which technologies the society specialise,
and what types of businesses are formed. To undertake entrepreneurship in
highly complex and uncertain technologies, requiring the coordination of
many specialists and experiments over long periods of time, requires the
pre-existence of large and diverse institutions capable of managing the scale
and scope of the risk created therein.
7. Australia's Innovation System scientific peer-review panels.
A key role then, and perhaps the key role of an innovation system, is to meet
these needs. Institutional arrangements that satisfy these demands facilitate
innovation; those that do not retard it. An important distinction among national
innovation systems is the relative emphasis they place on one or other of the
vehicles discussed above for entrepreneurial finance and risk management. Which
vehicles predominate can exercise a strong influence over the types of risk the nation's
system is best equipped to manage, and, in turn, to which type of technology it will
be most comfortable committing. The nature of the dynamic 'fit' between the
technically derived structure of risk, as described above, and various forms of risk
management vehicle, is complex. While all approaches are employed to at least
some extent in most successful countries, the weight given to each varies
considerably. US and 'Anglo-Saxon capitalism' typically relies more heavily on
venture capital; European 'welfare capitalism' gives a greater role to government
and banks; and Japanese 'keiretsu capitalism' relies more on large corporations'".
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How does Australia's innovation system measure up as a risk manager?
Unfortunately, Australia's innovation system fails on the two fronts ~ost (~ften cited
by critics; that is, its low level of support for factor creation, il~ particular 111
education and basic research, and its poor allowance for captunng above-normal
profits from innovation (through, for example, capital gains ~ax concessions and
premium prices). It also fails on the creation of an effectIve nsk-man~~ge~ent .
vehicle, suited for the tasks of contemporary innovation. The Australian rnnovanon
system is summarised schematically in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Australia's innovation system
• Vigorous IPO market.
• High capital gain tax, by international
For returns appropriation, Australia's system is also not encouraging. Capital
gains are taxed at a much higher rate in Australia than in competitor countries
(the United States taxes capital gains at 15 per cent, for example, compared to
Australia's 25 per cent), and no encouragement is given to innovators within that
regime. Prices for innovative goods such as new drugs are pushed downwards by
government in Australia, and little preference is shown for local innovators in
government purchasing.
Economic Activity
(Outputs)
• Many companies.
• Many competing regions.
But, tiny market
capitalisation.
t
'Integration'
Risk
Management
Appropriating
Returns
• Undiversified venture capital.
• Government and not-far-profits don't share risk.
Factor Creation
(Inputs)
• Weak not-far-profit sector.
• Modest government support.
• Few foreign PhDs.
=Weak knowledge creator.
On the factor-creation side of education, training and basic research (the creation
of 'options' to be tested in development activities), Australia's system is weak.
The not-far-profit sector is small, and does not orient towards innovation. It is
not encouraged by government with favourable tax treatment or other means.
Australia lacks a tradition of broad-based giving to science and education, such
as exists in the United States, and it does little to encourage its development.
Australia rather pursues never-ending debates as to whether a certain activiry
should be public sector (government) or private sector (business). Other than
sporadic lamentation of the lack of a philanthropic 'culture', few participants
in the debate seriously consider how to develop a sector independent from either,
to form the basis of factor creation in innovation.
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But the situation is worse for risk management. Despite recent growth, Australia
has developed little venture capital, and most of what does exist avoids
technologically risky investments. Only 5 per cent of the already small venture
capital pool in Australia goes to biotechnology, for example, a sector several
Australian governments have identified as one the nation would like to develop."
Australia's large companies have among the lowest ratios of R&D expenditure to
sales in the world, reflecting the fact they are largely confined to non-innovation-
oriented sectors in which such investment is peripheral to competitive success.
Government does not share innovation risk, beyond a scattering of programs at
the initial start-up phase (an approach that exacerbates the problem of excessive
fragmentation). In short, none of the vehicles most successful in innovating nations
that are employed to manage innovation risk are well developed in Australia.
8. Conclusion
These characteristics of the Australian innovation system all derive from a
common underlying philosophy. Today's policymaking elite is convinced that:
• innovation should be driven by the market
• it is inappropriate for the institutional system to discriminate between
innovation and replication as economic activities
• the system should not discriminate among types of technologies (these
beliefs are often summarised in the Australian phrase, 'the playing field
must be level')
if the market does not support innovation, so be it.
This philosophy, and the set of institutional and policy approaches ir has
shaped, makes perfect sense if Australia wants only to consume technology, and
not to produce it. If, on the other hand, Australia aspires to be a participant
in technology creation - and there are powerful arguments that it ultimately
must be if it is to remain prosperous and technologically capable - then it
needs now to investigate how appropriate risk management vehicles can be
developed. It should be apparent that the market alone will not come to the
nation's rescue.
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